Uk Law Reckless Endangerment

It is worth noting first of all that the arguments for complicating the analysis of recklessness in the manner described in the previous section are (even) stronger than those for « factually impossible » attempts, which are obviously doomed to failure. Attempts are « attacks ». Footnote 88 By intending to cause harm and (in its view) taking more than mere preparatory steps to that effect, the defendant « as an agent comes as close as possible to that harm. » Footnote 89 This link between the agency and the world is more flexible when it comes to recklessly endangering interests; The defendant does not intend to cause damage. This relaxation is accompanied by a less secure basis for conviction and deserved punishment. As Antony Duff explains,Footnote 14 based on German criminal theory,Footnote 15 « concrete » danger implies an interest that is in fact threatened by Φing:Footnote 16 In Parker, neighbours should be at home at the time of the fire in order for their lives to be « concretely » in danger. The « abstract » danger, on the other hand, implies a situation in which, although an interest has not been « concretely » put in the path of harm by Φing, Φing is the type of activity which tends to a « concrete » danger, even if not all signs of this activity imply it. Footnote 17 Starting a fire in a residential property can certainly be this type of activity. In Elliot v. C (minor),[14] a 14-year-old student with low intelligence, tired and hungry, accidentally set fire to a summer house. It was admitted that she had not foreseen the risk of fire and that she had not considered the possible consequences of her actions. The court reluctantly followed Caldwell. He noted that a defendant does not care whether property is destroyed if he does not consider the possibility that there is a risk of destruction of property, and that there is a risk of destruction of property that would be obvious to a reasonably prudent person, even if that risk would not have been obvious to the defendant (because of his age or lack of experience or understanding), if he had thought about the possibility that there might be a danger of property being destroyed.

State laws prohibit many reckless behaviors and view reckless actors as social dangers because they play with the safety of other people. A person injured by a civil lawsuit for the recklessness of others may receive compensation for all resulting medical expenses, loss of wages, rehabilitation, pain and suffering. In addition, carelessness can also allow the recovery of certain individuals who are usually exempt from liability for simple negligence, such as government employees and health professionals. In most states, a person can sue for personal injury and receive compensation for a number of damages resulting from someone else`s reckless behavior. People can also often recover legal fees incurred in a reckless tort lawsuit. If you think you have a potential recklessness claim, you should consult an experienced personal injury attorney to best protect your rights. The distinction between « concrete » and « abstract » danger is explained in more detail in § 2. The same applies to « resulting crimes » (footnote 121) if the accused unreasonably overstated the risk of harm in question ex ante. Footnote 122 For example, Sally believes that the risk of killing someone while driving at the indicated speed limit is incredibly high, but she chooses to do so. Frank suddenly emerges from a hidden alley next to the road and is run over and killed by Sally.

Sally should only be considered reckless with respect to the murder of another person if the risk of death, which could reasonably be assumed to exist ex ante, was unjustified to her in the circumstances. Here, this seems unlikely (assuming normal weather conditions, etc.), and it should exclude responsibility for a homicide that requires recklessness in relation to the death caused. Finally, it should be noted that a certain degree of vagueness is not unrelated to Alexander and Ferzan`s vision. They allow the liability of the defendant who considers that his willingness to take risks is justified (which takes sufficient account of the interests of others) if his decision in favour of Φ actually demonstrates that the interests of others have not been sufficiently taken into account. Footnote 109 This view is plausible. The defendant`s beliefs about what is sufficiently worrisome to others would put some of the worst risk-takers beyond the reach of the criminal law, that is, those who care so little about the interests of others that they would consider extreme risk-taking justified if a more « objective » view came to a different conclusion. Footnote 110 Any assessment of sufficient justification or concern other than that of the respondent will be as susceptible to divergence and opacity as the adequate limitation of recklessness advocated in this case. Footnote 111 Finally, the question arises as to whether there is simply « too much » arbitrariness when one goes beyond Alexander and Ferzan`s limited concession to a more « objective » perspective.