Cur Adv Vult Legal Definition

The Latin legal term curia advisari vult (abbreviation cur adv vult), which means « the court wants to examine the matter » (literally « to be advised »), is familiar to most people in the British legal system and appears in countless thousands of legal reports. But there is room for the well-twisted and memorable sentence when used discreetly. What real estate student can forget Lord Macnaghten`s famous remark that « it is one thing to get to the heart of a matter like Shelley`s and another to keep it there » (Van Grutten v Foxwell [1897] AC 658, 671)? And what about Lord Atkin`s simple question in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580, « So who is my neighbor in the law? » that preceded his permanent classical definition of due diligence in cases of negligence? These are surpassed in simplicity and persuasion only by Bowen LJ`s famous observation that « a person`s state of mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion » (Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459, 483). The favorite of some, especially those who share this leisure preference, is a remark by Lord Reid in Gollins v Gollins [1964] AC 644, 664: « No one but a lawyer would say that you must assume that I intended to put my ball in the bunker because it was the natural and probable result of my shot. » A feature of our common law system is that those who are appointed to judicial positions are not trained judges, which is in stark contrast to other legal systems. For example, Sir John Megaw, the highly respected Chancery judge who was previously a prominent commercial silk and rugby player, reportedly said when he was appointed a Supreme Court judge that he felt like a player who was pulled out of the crowd, blew a whistle and was asked to continue and direct the game. Until recent years, the situation was no different. It was expected that, from regular work in court, there would be an idea of how judges should go about it. We received no formal training or support in practical matters such as writing judgments, but it was expected that we would have absorbed this by listening to and reading judgments during practice and writing endless opinions. Cur adv vult or CAV are abbreviations of Curia advisari vult, which means in Latin « the court wanted to be advised ». It is used in a legal opinion to indicate that the judgment was reserved for the court instead of being rendered extemporaneous. Other regular habits of legal reporting are « false legal-historical » judgments, which Newark, as a true legal historian, snoops up enough than on the basis of half-memorized knowledge of the judge`s years of study; and the « too clear for arguments » type, of which Lord Halsbury LC was a famous representative. In the context of English law, A Dictionary of Law proposes the following legal concept of Cur.

Adv. Vult: (cur. adv. vult, c.a.v.) It can be argued that Latin has no place in modern judgment. However, some would argue that its use is quite acceptable, provided that the public understands what is being said, or that it can be explained easily and quickly, for example, by a legal representative of the customer. According to A Dictionary of Law, this is a description of Cur. Adv. Vult: (cur. adv. vult, c.a.v.) (Latin: curia advisari vult, « the court wants to examine the matter ») Curia advisari vult is a Latin legal term meaning « the court wants to examine the matter » (literally « the court wants to be advised »), a term that reserves the judgment for a later day.

It often appears in case reports, abbreviated as « Cur. Adv. vult », or sometimes « c.a.v. » or « CAV », when the Chamber takes the time for consultation after hearing the lawyer`s observations. [1] [2]. Although this statement was made in the context of a decision of an administrative authority, exactly the same considerations apply to judicial decisions. I would just like to add a reference to another point: well-founded and clearly reasoned decisions tend to be maintained more willingly in the appeal: verbum sapienti satis. Professor FH Newark, in his article « The Anatomy of a Law Report », (1965) 16 NILQ 371 (reproduced in the book of his writings Elegantia Juris, at p. 266), somewhat disapproved of the use of the common formal judgment, which he considered the hallmark of a pedestrian judge, but knowledge of its structure is a useful starting point: « The most common form – in fact, it could be called the `common form` model of judgment – is as follows.

Basically, it can be described as « Finding the Facts – Finding the Law – Adapting the Facts to the Law ». Simply put, this means that the court has reserved its judgment, as opposed to the so-called ex tempore judgment, which is rendered to the court immediately after the end of the hearing. The job of a judge is to make a decision and express it clearly and unambiguously in a language that is easy to understand. The elegance of the language may be a desirable bonus, but it is less important than the precision of the expression and the clarity of the argumentation. Related to this is the important factor, especially in the first case, the sufficiency and clarity of the results. Young lawyers were told, « You are paid for your opinion, not for your doubts, » and so too is it even more forceful for a judge. Abbreviation in the legal reports indicating that the judgment of the General Court was not delivered extemporally at the end of the hearing, but at a later date. The biggest criticism of judgments is that they are insufficiently structured rather than excessively long. In « Judgment Writing: An Antipodean Response », 129 LQR 2013, 7, Professor Peter Butt enthusiastically advocates the adoption of a new practice that I will call « frontloading », the conclusions being advanced, the evidence and the conclusion of fact being moved to the back of the text. Newark`s favorite is the « historical judgment, » such as that of Lord Macnaghten in Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495, which implements the principle enshrined in earlier precedents without going through what he calls the « dark test » of conflicting judgments in previous cases. Such judgments are absolutely admirable, but I would only say that they do require very high quality skills, knowledge and experience and, in general, should only be attempted by high-level courts of appeal.

As it is true. Hard-working, puisne judges sometimes protest that they don`t have the luxury of time to write shorter sentences. There is no self-contradiction in this statement: it is one of the fundamental truisms of the modern judicial world. When the case is appealed, sufficient explanation and analysis is desirable and necessary to show that the judge has considered all the issues that arise and that the reader can see why he or she fell to one side or the other. As Sedley J. stated in R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex p Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 All ER 651, 665: « Giving reasons can, among other things, focus the decision-maker`s mind on the right issues; show the recipient that this is the case; show that the problems have been addressed conscientiously and how the result has been achieved; or draw the recipient`s attention to a justiciable error in the process. If the case is used as a precedent, a decision taken after an adjournment may carry more weight than a decision taken orally immediately after the end of the proceedings (Latin: ex tempore). [5] [6]. Concise or colourful expression is another characteristic of judgments in a common law jurisdiction. Some judges have made it their trademark, such as Lord Denning. For some, perhaps more taste, is the opening sentence of Lord Devlin`s speech in McCutcheon v David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 430, 435: « If a person in Islay wants to send goods to the mainland, he goes to macBrayne`s (the defendant)`s office in Port Askaig, conveniently combined with the local post office. » Like one of Horace`s odes, one could not change a word without harming the flow of the language, and the reader quickly senses that the judicial artillery is rumbling in position to defend the rights of the humble islander against the evil shipping company that tries to rely on the fine print in its conditions of transport.

Returning to the theme of the Latin maxim, the interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium captures a concept to which Polonius gave a memorable expression in Shakespeare`s Hamlet, and the taste that easily applies to this long revelation. Ergo, I have a hard time finding the right word (a diplomatic counterpart – oops, another – for our Gallic neighbors) and I let my case rest. The use of Latin, although increasingly observed, is one of the established features of common law systems around the world. Some judges continue to advocate the use of Latinisms in their decisions. There are sentences that summarize a concept, principle, maxim or doctrine in a way that the English language cannot achieve. Consider, for example, audi alteram partem, nemo judex in causa sua, res judicata, ignorantia lexis non excusat, ad hoc, per incuriam, bona fide et pro tanto. And certainly the elegance and conciseness of the delegatus non potest delegare in the English language has no competition. Does Latin still have a place in modern judgment? Justice McCloskey examines the patterns and challenges of judgment writing in the common law system Newark describes in characteristic and entertaining terms certain types of judgments found in legal relationships. There was the verdict of « crying out for shame », pronounced or not, of which Lord Denning was a remarkable representative: « In this case, it will be a blatant shame if the plaintiff does not get a verdict. I will do my best to get him a verdict, and I will not allow many malicious precedents to oppose it if I can help him. ».